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Appendix 4

Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 227 U.S.P.Q. 543 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

GIES and DOUGIES sound much more actually rhyme, especially if (as highly probable to us and to the TTAB) "is pronounced as if derived from the Doug."⁴ This similarity in sound is truly important in this instance because evidence shows that its radio and television advertising has strongly stressed the identification of HUGGIES.

The Board thought the commercial impression the two marks differed significantly — suggesting a diaper which hugged a body, while HDE's would be perceived as derived from the name Doug. But this difference, not a striking one at most; it disappears in the face of the evidence that K-C often advertises its diapers in connection with one of a number of given names. "Doug" could be just such a name hereby suggesting that the two products come from the same source (or sponsor) and are somehow connected.

Think, too, that — though the TTAB Board ledged "the very substantial nature of sales and advertising of [K-C's] HUGGIES disposable diapers (over \$300 million in sales over \$15 million in advertising in the '82 alone)"⁵ — its decision took inadequate account of that *Dupont* factor. In view of strong record evidence on that point, we are in *Giant Foods, Inc., supra*, "that K-C's mark[s] have acquired considerable strength which weighs in its favor in determining likelihood of confusion." 710 F.2d at 1570, 53 USPQ at 394.⁶

Another factor favoring K-C is that, in the case of disposable diapers, only appellant has prior to appellee's use of DOUGIES) a two-syllable mark ending in "IES." There are no other goods of that type with that — except for DOUGIES.

The one factor plainly favoring HDE is here is no proof of actual confusion.

It appears that DOUGIES was in fact drawn from the family name of the chief figure in appellee's business, the Reverend Herman Douglas.

On another point, the Board recognized that appellant has built up extensive goodwill in the product bearing the mark and that purchasers have come to identify the mark as signifying K-C's products. HUGGIES mark has been used since June 1947 and HUGGIES diapers now rank among the three brands of disposable diapers.

Appellee quibbles that in the TTAB proceeding K-C did not explicitly say that its mark had acquired "fame," but there is no doubt that appellant presented much evidence on, and strongly stressed, the "extensive reputation," "well-known," "active," etc., characteristic of its mark HUGGIES. HDE conceded those facts.

Appellee insists that we should also count for it the fact that its trade dress is different from that of HUGGIES. It is settled, however, that a distinction in trade dress cannot weigh against likelihood of confusion with respect to the registration of a simple word mark like DOUGIES. The reason is that such dress might well be changed at any time; only the word mark itself is to be registered. *Vorando, Inc. v. Breuer Electric Mfg. Co.*, 390 F.2d 724, 727, 156 USPQ 340, 342 (CCPA 1968). Accordingly, HDE's strong reliance on *Quaker Oats Co. v. General Mills*, 134 F.2d 429, 56 USPQ 400 (7th Cir. 1943), is misplaced. That pre-Lanham Act decision did not at all involve registration of the mark "Oaties" (registration had in fact been denied) but solely differences in packaging and trade dress as against "Wheaties."

III.

[1] The upshot of our own appraisal of the pertinent factors is that there is indeed a likelihood of confusion with K-C's mark HUGGIES. We are not loath to reach this conclusion because of the teaching of our predecessor court — recently reiterated by this court — that there is "no excuse for ever approaching the well-known trademark of a competitor" and "that all doubt as to whether confusion, mistake, or deception is likely is to be resolved against the newcomer, especially where the established mark is one which is famous and applied to an inexpensive product bought by all kinds of people without much care." *Planters' Nut & Chocolate Co. v. Crown Nut Co.*, 305 F.2d 916, 924-25, 134 USPQ 504, 511 (CCPA 1962). To the same effect, see *Specialty Brands, supra*, 748 F.2d at 676, 223 USPQ at 1284. We therefore reverse the decision of the TTAB dismissing K-C's opposition.

REVERSED.

⁴ Belatedly, appellee argues that "HUGGIES" is descriptive but this separate defense was not raised in its pleadings or briefs below. Only the unlikelihood of confusion was raised against HUGGIES.

⁵ Reverend Douglas, principal in HDE, testified that he was aware of the "HUGGIES" mark before he adopted DOUGIES.

Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit

Interconnect Planning Corporation v. Feil, et al.

Nos. 84-1467 and 85-565

Decided October 9, 1985

PATENTS

1. Estoppel — As to validity — In general (§35.151)

Federal district court decision on patent validity, which was not final, not certified, not appealed, and mooted by subsequent events, does not collaterally estop appeal of those aspects of subsequent decision on reissue of patent which are "common to" earlier decision, since current appeal involves validity of claims of reissue patent, which was issue that did not exist at time of decision on validity of original patent claims.

2. Patentability — Anticipation — In general (§51.201)

Reissue — In general (§58.1)

Patent's reissuance with claims that are not substantially identical to original claim requires evaluation of invention as whole, as currently claimed, in terms of 35 USC 103, and original claims, whether valid or invalid, are not prior art against reissued claims.

3. Patentability — Aggregation or combination — In general (§51.151)

Federal district court erred by treating each prior art reference as teaching one or more of specific components for use in claimed system, even though such system did not then exist.

Particular patents — Telephone Switches

Re. 31,144, Feil, Multi-Station Telephone Switching System, holding of invalidity vacated.

Appeal from District Court for the Southern District of New York, Duffy, J.; 223 USPQ 961.

Action by Interconnect Planning Corporation, against Thomas E. Feil, Robert O. Carpenter, V Brand, Inc., and Turret Equipment Corp.,* for patent infringement and unfair competition, in which defendants counterclaim

* The complaint against Robert O. Carpenter and Turret Equipment Corp. was dismissed by stipulation, and they are not parties to this appeal.

for declaration of patent invalidity. From decision granting defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff appeals. Vacated and remanded.

Alfred P. Ewert, and Morgan, Finnegan, Pine, Foley & Lee, both of New York, N.Y. (Jerome G. Lee, Robert A. Molan, and Richard J. McGrath, on the brief, and Howard Karasik, and Sherman & Citron, P.C., both of New York, N.Y., of counsel) for appellant.

Lawrence G. Kurland, and Hubbell, Cohen, Steifel & Gross, P.C., both of New York, N.Y. (Lance J. Lieberman, Daniel L. Dolgin, Towne, Dolgin, Sawyer & Horton, Peter P. Stern, Theodore S. Steingut, and Berger, Steingut, Weiner, Fox & Stern, all of New York, N.Y., on the brief) for appellees.

Before Davis, Smith, and Newman, Circuit Judges.

Newman, Circuit Judge.

Interconnect Planning Corporation (IPC) appeals from the summary judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, *Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil*, 587 F.Supp. 1495, 223 USPQ 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), holding invalid all the claims of IPC's Reissue Patent No. 31,144 entitled "Multi-Station Telephone Switching System," invention of Thomas E. Feil, for failure to meet the conditions for patent validity under 35 U.S.C. § 103, and dismissing IPC's count for patent infringement. We hold that invalidity under § 103 has not been proven, as a matter of law. We vacate the summary judgment of invalidity and dismissal of the infringement count, and remand to the district court.

Background

The claims of Reissue Patent No. 31,144 are for certain telephone systems known as "trader turrets", which are multi-line telephone consoles used by the financial community in trading networks for securities, commodities, currency, and the like. The purpose of these systems is to facilitate concurrent telephone connections for traders requiring multiple sources of price information, conducting multiple transactions, and generally meeting the communication demands of busy, often hectic, financial trading enterprises. Trading rooms may house a hundred or more trader turrets:

Because of the large number of lines and connections required and the specific needs of these communication networks, these systems are complex. A high degree of reliability is required in their operation, because even momentary failures can be extremely costly.

The record shows that the Feil trader turrets rapidly achieved commercial success, displacing other systems then in use. IPC attributes the success of the Feil invention to its novel system "architecture", which enabled ease of operation, high capacity, and improved reliability over the systems then available. IPC's sales of the Feil trader turrets, according to the record, grew from \$320,000 for 20 units in 1974, its first year, to \$27,900,000 for 3500 units in 1983.

Thomas Feil, the inventor, was formerly an officer and part owner of IPC. In 1977 Mr. Feil formed the defendant company V Band Systems, Inc., and in 1980 Mr. Feil left IPC and joined V Band, of which he is president and chief executive officer. Defendants make and sell the trader turrets that are here accused of patent infringement.

On November 21, 1980, IPC filed suit in the Southern District of New York asserting infringement of U.S. Patent No. 3,991,282 (the '282 patent), invention of Thomas Feil. Defendants Feil and V Band raised the defense this patent was invalid in terms of 35 U.S.C. § 103. IPC's count for unfair competition was dismissed by the court and is not before us. Various counterclaims were separated and are apparently still pending.

In May of 1981 IPC filed in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the PTO) an application to reissue the '282 patent. IPC cited to the examiner articles by M.E. Ozenberger and W.H. Keith, both of the Bell Telephone Laboratories, on which articles defendants were relying before the district court, and which had not previously been before the examiner. The district court refused to stay the action before it pending completion of the reissue examination, and therefore the reissue examination was suspended by the PTO in accordance with its rules. On defendants' motion for summary judgment, the district court on June 1, 1982 held all claims of the '282 patent invalid for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. *Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil*, 543 F.Supp. 610, 614-19, 215 USPQ 734, 736-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).

Following this decision, at IPC's request the PTO resumed examination of the reissue application. The court's decision was provided to and considered by the examiner. A supple-

mental reissue de this decision as a tion. The '282 pa February 8, 1983 patent, RE 31,14 claims in various the newly cited p

Defendants m of invalidity of collateral estopp on the '282 pate ity under 35 U. motion, and the vits, depositions record. For reaso decision, the m was granted on

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Defendants are curtailed o Two separate raised, both a 1982 decision

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the inventor, was formerly an owner of IPC. In 1977 Mr. Feil left the defendant company V Band and in 1980 Mr. Feil left IPC Band, of which he is president and active officer. Defendants make their turrets that are here accused of infringement.

On 21, 1980, IPC filed suit in the District of New York asserting infringement of U.S. Patent No. 3,991,282 (the invention of Thomas Feil). Defendant V Band raised the defense that the patent is invalid in terms of 35 U.S.C. § 103. The district court's decision for unfair competition was affirmed by the court and is not before us. The claims were separated and are pending.

In 1981 IPC filed in the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (the PTO) an application for the '282 patent. IPC cited to the PTO the decision by M.E. Ozenberger and others of the Bell Telephone Laboratories, which articles defendants were before the district court, and which had been before the examiner. The district court stayed the action before it until the reissue examination by the PTO in accordance with the district court's summary judgment on June 1, 1982, holding the '282 patent invalid for infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 103. *Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil*, 543 F.Supp. 610, 734, 736-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).

This decision, at IPC's request the examination of the reissue application was provided to the district court by the examiner. A supple-

mental reissue declaration by IPC referred to this decision as a basis for the reissue application. The '282 patent was surrendered, and on February 8, 1983 the PTO granted the reissue patent, RE 31,144, IPC having restricted its claims in various ways and having overcome the newly cited prior art.

Defendants moved for summary judgment of invalidity of the reissue patent, asserting collateral estoppel based on the court's decision on the '282 patent, and also asserting invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 103. IPC resisted the motion, and the parties' memoranda, affidavits, depositions, and other documents are of record. For reasons similar to those of the 1982 decision, the motion for summary judgment was granted on June 20, 1984.

That decision, holding all of the reissue claims invalid, was certified and made final under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), with instructions by the court that IPC "attempt to have any appeal . . . heard at the same time and before the same panel" as any appeal from a decision on the same patent by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. We agreed. Both appeals are decided this day.

Although both appeals involved similar issues and argument, specific to the New York suit are certain procedural issues, as discussed *infra*.

Collateral Estoppel

Defendants argue that IPC's appeal rights are curtailed on the basis of collateral estoppel. Two separate but related issues of estoppel are raised, both arising out of the district court's 1982 decision on the '282 patent.

A.

Defendants assert first that IPC can not now appeal from or argue those aspects of the 1984 decision on the reissue patent which are "common to" the 1982 decision on the '282 patent, on the ground that those aspects could have been appealed earlier, and that it is too late to do so now. IPC asserts in response that (1) the issues are not the same, (2) a different patent is involved, and (3) the 1982 decision was not final.

Considering the finality issue, for collateral estoppel to arise the prior decision need not have been final in the sense of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 but, in the words of the Restatement, the prior

adjudication must have been "sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect". Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 (1982). Sufficient firmness, according to the Restatement, requires that the party against whom the estoppel is asserted have had the right, even if not exercised, to challenge on appeal the correctness of the earlier decision. Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 13 reporter's note comment f (1982). Defendants argue that IPC had three such opportunities: appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), which governs appeals from interlocutory orders involving injunctions; appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2), which governs appeals in patent infringement cases final except for an accounting; and appeal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), which governs judgment on fewer than all of multiple claims in an action.

None of these situations controls the case before us. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) relates to orders involving injunctions, and although defendants argue that IPC's complaint necessarily invokes this section, this does not impart automatic appealability to interlocutory orders that do not involve injunctions. As for 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2), the district court's judgment was not final except for an accounting, in light of the pendency of counterclaims. 9 J. Moore, B. Ward, & J. Lucas, *Moore's Federal Practice*, ¶ 110:19[4], at 220 (1985). Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 54(b) requires that the court have expressly directed entry of a final judgment, and that "[i]n the absence of such determination and direction, any [decision] which adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims". See also 6 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 54:42, at 813.

Neither IPC nor the defendants asked the district court to enter a final judgment on its decision holding the '282 patent invalid, and the court did not do so. Defendants assert, however, that IPC should now be estopped because it did not move for finality of the ruling nor request that the judgment be certified for interlocutory appeal. An application for certification is by no means certain to be granted and, in this case, IPC's eventual request for certification of the original decision was opposed by defendants and was refused by the court.

The law of collateral estoppel is not intended to penalize a party for declining to try to take a piecemeal appeal. Further, the '282 patent had been placed in reissue, and an appeal on the merits of patent claims for which reissue was being sought would have been a meaningless exercise, as may have been recognized at the time.

[1] We conclude that the district court's 1982 decision on the '282 patent claims, a

IPC Communications, Ltd. v. Standard Tele-services Supply, Inc., No. 81-1832D (D.N.J. 1984) (unreported), vacated and remanded, No. 84-1599 (Fed. Cir. _____, 1985) (unreported).

decision not final, not certified, not appealed, and mooted by subsequent events, lacks collateral estoppel effect for the purpose urged by defendants. The issue here on appeal is the validity of the claims of the reissue patent, an issue that did not exist at the time of the decision on validity of the '282 patent claims. There is no estoppel against appellate review of all aspects pertinent to the decision on the reissue claims. 1B Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.441 [3.-3], at 737.

B.

IPC asserts that the district court incorrectly invoked collateral estoppel when it analyzed the reissue claims by comparing them with the original claims of the '282 patent, then applying prior art only to the differences between the reissue claims and the original claims. Our predecessor court, the U.S. Court of Claims,² has confronted related situations, wherein estoppel was raised as to unadjudicated claims of a patent whose other claims had been adjudicated in an earlier action. The Court of Claims adopted a pragmatic approach, stating that the first step was to determine whether any new issues were raised as to the nonlitigated claims. In *Westwood Chemical, Inc. v. United States*, 525 F.2d 1367, 1375, 187 USPQ 656 (Ct. Cl. 1975), adopting 186 USPQ 383, 389 (Ct. Cl. Tr. Div. 1975), the court said:

Where obviousness is the basis for the prior invalidity holding, an inquiry into the identity of the validity issue is more properly phrased in terms of the factual inquiries mandated by *Graham v. John Deere Co.*, 383 U.S. 1, 17, 148 USPQ 459, 466-467, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966); as a prerequisite to such a validity determination.

Applying the *Graham* guidelines, the court said:

Thus, the inquiry should be whether the nonlitigated claims present new issues as to the art pertinent to the nonlitigated claims; as to the scope and content of that art; as to the differences between the prior art and the nonlitigated claims; and as to the level of ordinary skill in that art. If none of these inquiries raises any new triable issues, then the obviousness determination in the prior proceeding should be equally applicable to the nonlitigated claims.

² In *South Corp. v. United States*, 690 F.2d 1368, 215 USPQ 657 (Fed. Cir. 1982), the Federal Circuit adopted as precedent the decisions of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.

Id. See also *Bourns, Inc. v. United States*, 537 F.2d 486, 199 USPQ 256 (Ct. Cl. 1976), adopting 187 USPQ 174 (Ct. Cl. Tr. Div. 1975); *Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States*, 496 F.2d 535, 538, 182 USPQ 172, 175 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (in determining the applicability of the estoppel, the first consideration is "whether the issue of invalidity common to each action is substantially identical.").

The question of substantial identity of reissue claims arose in *Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Oklahoma, Inc.*, 607 F.2d 885, 203 USPQ 27 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018, 204 USPQ 696 (1980), wherein the court determined that the reissue claims were not substantially identical to the original claims, and therefore that collateral estoppel did not apply.

In *Bourns*, responding to plaintiff's argument that according collateral estoppel effect to non-identical adjudicated claims would amount to treating the claims previously held to be invalid as prior art, the court agreed that this would be inappropriate:

A domino approach in which each successively narrower claim is compared with the one before it, not with the prior art, is inappropriate since it improperly gives prior-art effect to the subject matter of an invalid claim. *In re Craig and Street*, Cust. & Pat. App., 411 F.2d 1333, 1335, 162 USPQ 157, 158-159 (1969).

537 F.2d at 493, 187 USPQ at 179.

The district court compared the reissue claims with the '282 claims, and erroneously concluded that reissue claims 1 through 6 were substantially identical to the original claims, and that reissue claims 7 through 9, although not substantially identical, involved some substantially identical "issues".

This erroneous legal conclusion may have compounded the error in the next step, wherein the court compared the differences between the original and the reissue claims with prior art that was pertinent only to those differences, thus effectively giving the original claims prior art effect — the pitfall against which *Bourns* cautioned:

A claim may be invalid for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 but still describe a combination not found in the prior art. Moreover, it is well settled that each claim of a patent is entitled to a presumption of validity and is to be treated as a complete and independent invention. 35 U.S.C. §§ 282, 288. *Leeds & Catlin v. Victor Talking Machine Co.*, 213 U.S. 301, 319, 29 S.Ct. 495, 53 L.Ed. 805 (1909); *Smith Industries International v. Hughes Tool Co.*, 396 F.2d 735, 736 (5th Cir. 1968).

Inc. v. United States, 537 SPQ 256 (Ct. Cl. 1976), 174 (Ct. Cl. Tr. Div. *lance, Inc. v. United States*, 182 USPQ 172, 175 (Ct. mining the applicability of st consideration is "whether identity common to each action ntical.").

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& *Catlin v. Victor Talking*
13 U.S. 301, 319; 29 S.Ct.
05 (1909); *Smith Industries*
Hughes Tool Co., 396 F.2d
ir. 1968).

[2] *Id.* When a patent has been reissued with claims that are not substantially identical to the original claims, the invention as a whole, as now claimed, must be evaluated in terms of 35 U.S.C. § 103. The original claims, whether valid or invalid, are not prior art against the reissued claims.

The Summary Judgment

The proceeding from which this appeal is taken was styled "summary", in that the court's decision was made on defendants' motion for summary judgment. The earlier decision on the '282 patent was also made on defendants' motion for summary judgment. IPC contends that the matter was inappropriate to summary judgment, in view of the presence of disputed issues of material fact.

Defendants Feil and V Band argued before the district court, and repeat before us, that no material fact is in dispute, that the questions before the district court and before us in this appeal are purely legal ones, and that the issue was properly dealt with summarily. In its discussion of reissue claims 7 through 9, which claims had no counterpart in the original patent, the district court referred to "claims and issues that have not yet been subjected to a full and fair adjudication", 587 F.Supp. at 1500, 223 USPQ at 965; the court viewed both proceedings as "full" as well as fair, a process not always accommodated by summary proceedings on a documentary record.

Obviousness *vel non* under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is a question of law, whose conclusion requires preliminary determination of several underlying factual issues, as set out in *Graham v. John Deere Co.*, 338 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966). See also *Gardner v. TEC Systems, Inc.* 725 F.2d 1338, 1344-45, 220 USPQ 777, 782-83 (Fed. Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 116, 225 USPQ 232 (1984). These factual issues relate to the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention as a whole, the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made, and the so-called "secondary considerations" that reflect the contemporaneous response to the invention.

In reviewing IPC's assertions that there were genuine issues of material fact relating to the *Graham* inquiries, we have reviewed the submissions of the parties. Before the court, according to the record, were all the references cited as prior art, as well as the depositions of Examiner Randall P. Myers of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, engineer

John Fitzmaurice of New York Telephone, and inventor/defendant Thomas E. Feil; and various documentary exhibits. Also of record were the affidavits of Alan R. Fitzpatrick, president of American Telecommunications Concepts; IPC's technical experts: Dennis Maywald and Herbert Goldwag; Thomas P. Bradbury, vice president and treasurer of IPC; and extensive written submissions and arguments.

Although fact and opinion are intertwined in many of these documents, the factual considerations required by the *Graham* analysis appear to have been adequately presented in the record. The technological structure and operation of the devices of the prior art were not in material dispute, although there was strong dispute about the relationship of the teachings of the references to the problems solved by the Feil system, and the weight to be given to evidence of the Feil invention's commercial success.

The district court stated that expert testimony was unnecessary, *Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil*, 587 F.Supp. at 1497; 223 USPQ at 963, and held all of the reissue claims invalid. As will be discussed, we think that the district court reached this conclusion by incorrectly applying the law of 35 U.S.C. § 103.

35 U.S.C. § 103

Those charged with determining compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 103 are required to place themselves in the minds of those of ordinary skill in the relevant art at the time the invention was made; to determine whether that which is now plainly at hand would have been obvious at such earlier time.

The invention must be viewed not with the blueprint drawn by the inventor, but in the state of the art that existed at the time.

The invention must be evaluated not through the eyes of the inventor, who may have been of exceptional skill, but as by one of "ordinary skill." See *Stewart-Warner Corp. v. City of Pontiac, Michigan*, 767 F.2d 1563,

³ IPC argues that the district court should not have resolved any question of substantial identity between the claims of the original and reissue patents in defendants' favor because that is a contested fact question which should not have been resolved against the nonmovant, citing *Tee-Pak, Inc. v. St. Regis Paper Co.*, 491 F.2d 1193, 1200, 181 USPQ 75, 80 (6th Cir. 1974). Under this court's precedent substantial identity between claims, a matter of claim interpretation, is a question of law. See, e.g., *Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp.*, 724 F.2d 951, 956, 220 USPQ 592, 596 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 127, 225 USPQ 232 (1984).

conclusion, the reissue is clothed in a statutory veil, and clear and convincing to surmount this. *Hoist & Derrick Co.*, 55 F.2d 1350, 1359-60, 1st Cir., cert. denied, 300 U.S. 520 (1944).

B.

the content of the prior art terms, occasionally reference to explain its amended art of telephone components pointed out, it is not each of the components, and had been used in the Feil did not claim to the components of his

ion of the prior art it court, guided by the reference as teaching specific components for use though the Feil system did the court reconstructed the blueprint of the Feil established, this is legal *Verly-Clark Corp.*, 713 F.2d 781, 791 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 104 S.Ct. 1284, 224

art's analysis of reissue only its analysis of the reissue claim and the differences between the original claim. In claim brackets appeared in the reissue no part of the reissue ed in italics was added

system in which telephone is capable of being telephone station of a stations over a stand-by directly connecting to a selected standard plurality of standard lines capable of being each of said plurality of an improvement

contacts, with respective being connected with standard telephone d communication; s, with respective ones controlling respective to be opened or closed;

a plurality of sets of *non-locking* pushbutton [switch means] *switches* with each set of pushbutton [switch means] *switches* connected to respective ones of said telephone stations with respective ones of said pushbutton [switch means] *switches* of said sets of pushbutton [switch means] *switches* corresponding to respective ones of said standard telephone lines and being connected with respective ones of said relay coils and being depressed for energizing a selected one of said relay coils for closing a corresponding pair of contacts to allow said telephone communication; [and]

an *electronic holding circuit for each of said relay coils, said holding circuits being operative*

to establish a held state after initial energization of the associated relay coil by momentarily depressing the associated pushbutton switch, and

to maintain said corresponding pair of contacts closed while in the held state;

a *logic circuit for each station connected to said holding circuits to detect conditions for releasing the held state;*

each of said stations comprising [first light display means] *a set of status lights*; connection means connecting corresponding pushbuttons of said sets of pushbutton [switch means] *switches* in each of said stations and to said [first light display means] *status lights* for energizing said [first light display means] *status lights* in each station to display the status of each of said plurality of standard telephone lines in each of said stations;

said station further comprising [first light display means] *an active line indicator separate from said status lights* connected to said pushbutton [switch means] *switches* for identifying the standard telephone line of said plurality of standard telephone lines that the telephone station is using for said telephone communication.

Reissue claim 1 was held invalid on two grounds. The first ground was that it was substantially identical to claim 1 of the '282 patent, and thus invalid on the basis of collateral estoppel. The court in its 1982 decision referred to Carter U.S. Patent No. 3,150,238 and Foulkes U.S. Patent No. 3,757,056 as disclosing "non-locking buttons, relay coils and pairs of contacts" as applied to the original claim 1. In the 1984 decision the court stated that "Claim 1 has not been changed in such a way that alters the above finding of disclosure by prior art." 587 F.Supp. at 1499, 223 USPQ at 964. This treatment of the reissue claim is not supported by the claim content, as will be apparent from the court's further discussion of claim 1.

As the second ground for its holding of invalidity the court analyzed the changes made by reissue. The court identified three areas as new to reissue claim 1, and applied five references to these areas as follows: "See Defendants' Exhs. C13, D4-D6 (non-locking buttons); Defendants' Exhs. C4, C7 (holding circuits); Defendants' Exhs. C16, C13 (separate active lines)." *Id.* at 1499, 223 USPQ at 964 (footnotes omitted).

The first set of cited exhibits refers to articles by Keith, "A New Switching System for 'Right of Way' Companies," *Bell Laboratories Record*, Apr. 1968, and Ozenberger, "Voice Communication System for Air Traffic Control," *Bell Laboratories Record*, May 1961, which the court stated taught the use of non-locking pushbuttons. The second set refers to the Carter patent, which the district court said teaches a "Relay Control Circuit" (the title of the Carter patent), and the Foulkes patent which "recites that '[e]ach of these [control] circuits may take any desired and presently known form . . . to perform a recognized control function . . . evaluat[ing] the 'hold' feature' ". *Id.* at 1499 n.6, 223 USPQ at 946 n.6. The third set of exhibits refers to Simon U.S. Patent No. 3,928,732, which the district court described by its title, "Extension and Line Indicating Display System for Key Telephone System," and Keith, which the district court stated "also discloses separate active lines." *Id.* at 1499 n.7, 223 USPQ at 964 n.7.

The court's analysis of the scope of the new material in reissue claim 1 in itself shows the error in the court's conclusion that as a matter of law reissue claim 1 is substantially identical to its parent claim. The claim limitations of the electronic holding circuits for each relay coil, the logic circuit, and separate active line indicator, in combination with the non-locking pushbutton switches connected to the relay coils, were added by reissue. Observing these differences, their relationship to the invention as a whole, and the prior art, we conclude as a matter of law that reissue claim 1 is not substantially identical to the original claim. The 1982 decision, which was directed to the original claims, does not apply to the reissue claims. Collateral estoppel as a basis for the court's holding of invalidity is not supported in law.

Having determined that a reissue claim is not substantially identical to the parent, the parent claim is of no further moment. As stated in *Wayne-Gossard Corp. v. Moretz-Hosiery Mills, Inc.*, 539 F.2d 986, 991; 191 USPQ 543, 546-47 (4th Cir. 1976), "the original claim was at an end, denuded of all potency save as a bench mark of interpretation, at the time of the reissue's infringement."

The original claim is not prior art against the reissue claim. It is not correct to weigh the reissue claim against the original claim. It is not correct to weigh the changes in the reissue claim against the original claim. It is the reissue claim alone that is to be analyzed in accordance with the *Graham* guidelines, and the differences to be considered are the differences between the reissue claim as a whole and the prior art.

In the court's 1982 analysis of the original claims, to which the court referred in its 1984 decision, the court had identified "six principal features which plaintiff argues are not obvious" and explained why the court concluded that these features are obvious by referring to various prior art references showing various of the features in various contexts. *Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil*, 543 F.Supp. at 617, 215 USPQ at 739. As we have observed, it is the emphasis on the obviousness of "features," rather than the claimed telephone system as a whole, that constitutes the flaw in the application of section 103 to the Feil claims. As stated in *In re Shuman*, 361 F.2d 1008, 1012, 150 USPQ 54, 57 (CCPA 1966):

It is impermissible to first ascertain factually what appellants *did* and then view the prior art in such a manner as to select from the random facts of that art only those which may be modified and then utilized to reconstruct appellants' invention from such prior art.

The court in 1982 summarized its conclusion with respect to these six "features" by observing: (1) that although the pairs of contacts and relay coils "is not disclosed in either the Keith Article or the Ozenberger Article"; the Foulkes and Carter patents do disclose them; (2) that Keith, Ozenberger, and Foulkes refer to pushbutton switches; (3) that Keith shows a set of display lamps although Ozenberger uses a single lamp, and that Paraskevakos (U.S. Patent No. 3,727,003) and Simon et al. show either a digital display or the incoming line number; (4) that Paraskevakos shows a decoder and that "the diode matrix was no mystery to one engineer" (Thomas Fitzmaurice, of Bell Labs, who testified that he readily understood the Feil system after he was shown it); (5) that Keith shows which lines are active; and (6) that the asserted unique master station hook up with blocking means is shown in Ozenberger and a Verdon patent (U.S. Patent No. 3,819,871). *Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil*, 543 F.Supp. at 617-19, 215 USPQ at 739-40.

In its 1984 decision the court added the additional citations of references pertinent to the changes in the reissue claims, as discussed above. As in its citation of references against the various features of the original claims, the

court selected from each reference a feature or features that also appeared in the reissue claims. No reference, however, suggested the overall arrangement, the "architecture", of the Feil system.

IPC presented affidavit testimony explaining the references in the context of the state of the telephone systems art at the time, none of which testimony was controverted other than by attorney argument. The most advanced multi-line devices at the time the invention was made, according to this record, used the then state-of-the-art crossbar switching equipment, and electrical or mechanical interconnections or interlocks. The two Bell Labs publications of Keith and Ozenberger, on which defendants and the district court placed substantial emphasis, used crossbar switching. Feil did not.

Mr. Feil's affidavit filed with the district court states "The Ozenberger and Keith articles disclose what I thought I invented in 1974". Mr. Feil made no reference to the crossbar switches required by these references, and offered no discussion of either differences or similarities between his system and those of these references.

The Carter patent used relay switches in the telephone switching system it describes. Carter, of Bell Laboratories, taught the use of quick-release control relays in combination with slow-release work relays, to achieve the specific purposes desired by Carter. Carter also required use of a "locking chain" rather than independently operating relays, and a more complex communication path as compared with Feil's direct connections. Feil established multiple direct connections in a system where theretofore it was believed, according to the record, that crossbar switches would be required.

The Feil system eliminated both crossbar switches and mechanical interlocks or mechanically locking pushbuttons, and instead used relays, a well-known type of switch. But Feil avoided the need (of Carter) to establish potentially large numbers of contacts and operates a concomitantly large number of relays in series in order to connect stations within the system. As IPC's uncontroverted testimony shows, Feil avoided interconnections and interlocks, both of which, according to the Maywald affidavit, had previously been considered necessary to lock out faults. The Maywald affidavit stated that Carter's approach would be "impossible and impractical" in the trader turret application because "[t]o try and accurately control the release times of different relays over a long period of time would be virtually impossible considering the wear and deterioration of components" in a "trader turret network involving some 20,000 or more relays". Maywald's explanation of the

technical operation contradicted, although attorney conclusions.

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tradicted, although defendants take issue in
attorney argument with Maywald's
conclusions.

The Foulkes patent, on which the district
court also relies, described a "bipolar multi-
plexing circuit" based on a "contact tree" relay
switching arrangement. Foulkes taught a tele-
phone system that Maywald avers, without
contradiction, "could not be realistically ex-
panded into large systems like trader turrets".
The district court did not explain how the
Foulkes or other systems of different circuitry
made obvious the different system of Feil's
claims.

The Keith and Ozenberger systems, as pre-
viously discussed, are different systems from
that of Feil. Like the systems of the other
references, they contain some elements in com-
mon with that of Feil. The Ozenberger system,
based on crossbar switches, was designed for
air traffic control. The Keith system is de-
scribed as tailored to the specific needs of
"right-of-way" companies, and is a cordless
system limited to up to eight consoles of up to a
hundred lines. As Keith says, "[a] system of
crossbar switches is the heart of the switching
system". Neither Keith nor Ozenberger sug-
gests that the crossbars be replaced with relays
and that the other changes be made to produce
the admittedly different Feil system.

The novelty of the Feil system is not contro-
verted by the defendants. Its value in trader
turret systems has received the ultimate recog-
nition, market success and imitation.

35 U.S.C. § 103 requires that obviousness
be determined with respect to the invention as
a whole. See, e.g., *Jones v. Hardy*, 727 F.2d
1524, 1528, 220 USPQ 1021, 1024 (Fed. Cir.
1984); *W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock,
Inc.*, 721 F.2d 1540, 1548; 220 USPQ 303,
309 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct.
172 (1984); *Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.*,
713 F.2d 1530, 1537, 218 USPQ 871, 877
(Fed. Cir. 1983). This is essential for combi-
nation inventions, for generally all combina-
tions are of known elements. *Environmental
Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of California*,
713 F.2d 693, 698, 218 USPQ 865, 870 (Fed.
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 709, 224
USPQ 520 (1984).

When prior art references require selective
combination by the court to render obvious a
subsequent invention, there must be some rea-
son for the combination other than the hind-
sight gleaned from the invention itself. *ACS
Hospital Systems, Inc. v. Montefiore Hospital*,
732 F.2d 1572, 1577 & n.14; 221 USPQ 929,
933 & n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1984). There must be
"something in the prior art as a whole to
suggest the desirability, and thus the obvious-
ness, of making the combination". *Lindemann*

*Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist
and Derrick Co.*, 730 F.2d 1452, 1462, 221
USPQ 481, 488 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Critical to the analysis is an understanding
of the particular results achieved by the new
combination. The claims here at issue are
directed to a combination of known compo-
nents of telephone systems in an admittedly
new way to achieve a new total system. Nei-
ther the district court in its opinion, nor the
defendants, identified any suggestion in the
prior art that the components be combined as
they were by Feil or that such combination
could achieve the advantages of the Feil
system.

Not only must the claimed invention as a
whole be evaluated, but so also must the refer-
ences as a whole, so that their teachings are
applied in the context of their significance to a
technician at the time — a technician without
our knowledge of the solution. The defendants
propounded and the district court appears to
have followed an analytical method that well
illustrates the "mosaic" analogy discussed in
W.L. Gore & Assocs., 721 F.2d at 1552, 220
USPQ at 322, where this court said:

[T]he claims were used as a frame, and
individual naked parts of separate prior art
references were employed as a mosaic to
recreate a facsimile of the claimed invention.

Defendants refer to the decision of the Su-
preme Court in *Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.*, 425
U.S. 273, 189 USPQ 449 (1976). As the Court
there held, Sakraida's combination of old ele-
ments to wash barn floors with flowing water
did not produce a new or different function,
and affirmed the district court's holding that
"all of the elements of [the combination] are
old . . . and the combination of them . . . being
neither new nor meeting the test of non-obvi-
ousness." *Id.* at 274, 189 USPQ at 450. In
the Feil invention the combination was admit-
tedly new, and it produced a new system
having theretofore unavailable attributes.

Recognizing the difficulty of casting one's
mind back to the state of technology at the time
the invention was made, courts have long rec-
ognized the usefulness of evidence of the con-
temporaneous attitude toward the asserted in-
vention: A retrospective view of the invention
is best gleaned from those who were there at
the time. Mr. Feil, the inventory impugning
his own invention, now avers that he did no
more than did the prior art, specifically the
Keith and Ozenberger articles. Mr. Feil's dis-
avowal of his invention is staunch, although he
less modestly commented in 1977, before he
left IPC, on the reaction of Bell Labs' engineer
at that earlier time:

He [Fitzmaurice] showed too much enthusi-
asm. I mean, he was really excited by the

thing. Like this is incredible. You guys are geniuses.

You're 50 miles ahead of Bell Labs. (App. Vol. VI, F357).

You know what he said. He said You're 50 miles ahead of Bell Lab? He said "miles", not years, he made it in miles. You're 50 miles ahead of the Bell Labs. (App. Vol. VI, F355).

Mr. Elia of the Republic Bank, one of IPC's customers, attested:

Upon viewing the equipment, the AT&T people indicated that it was unbelievable. They did not think it could be done. They were surprised that it was done. (App. Vol. VI, F360).

Although the district court remarked in its 1982 decision that evidence of commercial success "cannot be afforded any weight" "in light of my finding of obviousness", 543 F.2d at 619, 215 USPQ at 741, such evidence when present must be considered and afforded appropriate weight. *Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc.*, 739 F.2d 1573, 1575, 222 USPQ 744, 746 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 2138 (1985); *Jones v. Hardy*, 727 F.2d at 1530, 220 USPQ at 1026; *Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc.*, 721 F.2d 1563, 1575, 220 USPQ 97, 105 (Fed. Cir. 1983); *Stratoflex, Inc.*, 713 F.2d at 1538-39, 218 USPQ at 879; *In re Sernaker*, 702 F.2d 989, 996, 217 USPQ 1, 7 (Fed. Cir. 1983); *In re Mageli*, 470 F.2d 1380, 1383, 176 USPQ 305, 307 (CCPA 1973). IPC offered affidavit and deposition evidence, by two experts in telephone systems and by a Bell system engineer knowledgeable in the field of trader turrets. Their uncontroverted testimony was to the effect that the Feil system was perceived at the time as an exceptional technological achievement.

The requirement that "secondary considerations" be considered in determinations under section 103 aids in evaluating the state of the art at the time the invention was made. *In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468, 1475, 223 USPQ 785, 790 (Fed. Cir. 1984). It is not pertinent that the invention was easily understood after it was made — a factor that appears to have been considered significant by the district court; see 543 F.Supp. at 619, 215 USPQ at 741 — but whether it would have been obvious to make the invention at the time. Giving due weight to the market success and contemporaneous reaction to the Feil trader turret system, the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence that the Feil invention of the reissue claims would have been obvious to one

of ordinary skill in this art at the time the invention was made.

Reissue claims 2-9 are either dependent on reissue claim 1, include similar limitations, or include additional limitations. Although each claim has been considered separately, they need not here be treated in redundant detail. For each claim we are compelled to the conclusion that the burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence has not been met.

The summary judgment of invalidity of Reissue Patent No. 31,144, in terms of 35 U.S.C. § 103, is vacated, as is the dismissal of the infringement claim. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent herewith.

VACATED and REMANDED.

District Court, S.D. New York

The Authors League of America, Inc., et al. v. Davis L. Ladd, Register of Copyrights, et al.

No. 82 Civ. 5731

Decided October 8, 1985

COPYRIGHTS

1. In general (§24.01)

Copyright Act's manufacturing clause, which prohibits importation or public distribution within U.S. of certain copyrighted publications which are written by American authors or domiciliaries and which are manufactured abroad, does not violate First Amendment.

Action by The Authors League of America, Inc., and Irwin Karp, The Association of America Publishers, Plaintiff-Intervenor, against David L. Ladd, Register of Copyrights, James Baker, Secretary of the Treasury, and William Von Raab, Commissioner, United States Customs Service, to challenge the constitutionality of Copyright Act "manufacturing clause," 17 USC 601-603. On defendants' motion to dismiss and on parties' cross-

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